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There has been considerable eort in ascertaining with condence the trends in income
inequality in South Africa. South Africa has traditionally been among the most unequal
countries in the world and continues to be so. Surprisingly, levels of inequality have not
decreased despite the transition to democratic rule in the 1990s; if any, they seem to have
increased. There has also been considerable work on the proximate causes of these high
levels of inequality on the basis of inequality decompositions (See Leibbrandt, Levinsohn
and McCrary 2010, Leibbrandt. Woolard, Finn and Argent 2010, and Bhorat et al. 2009
for recent analyses). However, much less is known about the underlying causes of this high
level of inequality and of its persistence.
At the same time, there has been growing interest in the international literature in un-
derstanding the determinants of inequality dynamics and, in particular, the reasons for its
widespread persistence. In this context, the concept of an \inequality trap" has emerged
(see Bourguignon et al. 2007). The concept rests on the idea of multiple equilibria. An
inequality trap is a situation where some group of individuals is consistently disadvantaged
with respect to another, and where there could potentially be a feasible alternative situation
where no group is consistently disadvantaged. Inequality traps can be driven by dierent
types of mechanisms, such as political, economic, etc.
This paper is a rst step in exploring the potential of this research framework to shed light
on inequality persistence in South Africa. We review the theoretical literature containing
models that give rise to inequality traps. We briey discuss the potential of these mechanisms
for South Africa. The aim of the paper is to stimulate research in two directions: Use the
framework of inequality traps to understand a particular case of persistently high inequality,
South Africa; and use the peculiarities of the South African case to help expanding and
rening the framework.
The theoretical models reviewed in this paper (models of of inequality traps) are of a specic
type. They address both the causes and the consequences of inequality. Typically, they focus
2on some factor that simultaneously aects, and is aected by, the distribution of income, with
a mechanism of the following type: Income distribution today =) Some factor =) Income
distribution tomorrow. In this way, multiple equilibria can be generated. Low inequality
may lead to a particular value of the factor in question which, in turn, regenerates low
inequality, and similarly with high inequality. The high inequality case corresponds to the
inequality trap. In order to generate these type of mechanisms, models of inequality traps
need to consider some sort of interaction between the rich and the poor. It is the interaction
between the rich and the poor in some sphere that makes the distribution of income play a
key role for the determination of that factor that will in turn determine the relative returns
of rich and poor in the future.
It is important to note the type of models that fall outside the scope of this review. First,
models of poverty traps alone are not considered. Poverty traps are situations where poverty
begets poverty. But in these models, the rich and the poor need not interact. For instance, in
a nutritional poverty trap, low wages lead to insucient nutrition which in turn leads to low
productivity and low wages. This is a trap, but not an inequality trap. The behaviour of the
rich in this setting does not aect the poor. As we shall see, many models of inequality traps
include a poverty trap as an ingredient, but inequality traps require the additional feature
that the income distribution determines future relative returns. A second type of factors
falling outside the scope of this review are those those that aect inequality but that are not
in turn aected by it; i.e. that do not lead to traps. Factors such as skill biased technological
change or international trade fall into this category. These factors are commonly considered
as causes of the increase in inequality in Anglo-saxon countries in recent decades, but the
income distribution has not been identied as a key determinant of them.1
The paper is organized on the basis of the dierent realms where the rich and poor interact.
We consider economic, political and social mechanisms. In the economic mechanisms, the
rich and poor interact either in production or in markets. In the political mechanisms, rich
and poor interact in the determination of policy, for instance by voting for redistribution. In
1An exception is the model by B enabou (2005), a model where inequality leads to the adoption of skill
biased technology.
3the social mechanisms rich and poor interact in the social sphere, for instance through peer
eects which leads to education externalities.
To our knowledge, this is the rst systematic review of these types of models. Piketty (2000),
presents an excellent review of inequality dynamics in the Handbook of Income Distribution,
but has a dierent scope. His review is more general in that he focuses on mechanisms that
make income dierences, not inequality dierences, persist. At the same time we cover other
types of mechanisms, such as political mechanisms and also update the literature to include
the more recent contributions.
The section on economic mechanisms show that through these type of mechanisms inequality
traps can emerge in a variety of ways. First, through educational choices where the rich
become skilled and the poor unskilled, and where they interact in production as imperfect
substitutes. Second, through the price of a market that has the rich and the poor on dierent
sides: in the labour market, the rich may become entrepreneurs, demanding labour, and the
poor labourers, supplying it; in the credit market, the rich may become lenders and the poor
borrowers, or vice versa, etc. The mechanism of the inequality trap is essentially the same
in all cases. Borrowing and non-convex investment opportunities (for example with a xed
cost, such as the cost of college or the cost of starting a rm) imply that the rich end up in
good activities or occupations (undertaking \good" investments). When the rich are scarce
(as skilled workers, as entrepreneurs, or as lenders) the returns to the rich \activities" are
high and to the poor ones are low: high skilled wages, low unskilled ones (or high prots and
low wages for the labour market, or high interest rates for the credit market where the rich
are the lenders). This implies high inequality and also implies that the poor remain poor so
that the rich remain scarce, thus provoking the inequality trap.
The section on political mechanisms briey reviews the political economy literature aiming
to extract insights on how inequality can persist through pro-rich policies and how the latter
come about; it also presents a very exploratory look at some data on South Africa, where
available. We discuss three types of potential drivers of inequality traps via the political
sphere. First, demand factors implying that the median voter cares about factors other
4than her current income and thus may vote for low taxes. Seeing indications of very high
degrees of over-optimism regarding their children's economic status among South Africans,
demand factors promise to be a fruitful avenue of research. Second, factors generating a
richer pivotal voter than the median, where, eectively, the poor lose voice in the political
process. Although poor South Africans do not appear to abstain more than the rich, the
rich may come to dominate politics through other ways, such as lobbying. Third, we discuss
the impact of clientelism on redistribution, i.e. models where redistribution does not come
through a uniform tax rate, but where it takes a particularistic form, targeted to particular
groups or individuals. This research area is to date unexplored in South African politics.
The fourth section presents a brief overview of key social mechanisms that explain how
inequality may persist across generations. This strand of the literature is mostly concerned
with neighbourhood eects, in particular the eects of one's residential neighbourhood on
education and income inequality (Bnabou 1993, 1996; Durlauf 1996; Fernandez and Rogerson
1997, etc.). In those models, a child's education is determined among others by school
quality and the characteristics of the residents of his neighbourhood.Parental income matters
because it determines the choice of the neighbourhood in which families live. Within this
setting, relatively unequal economic status may persist across generations in the presence of
economic segregation. If rich families concentrate in neighbourhoods with high quality social
interaction (good education, presence of role models, peer eects, etc.) while poor families
live in poor neighbourhoods (where education performance is poor and children lack role
models), the trajectory of these families is bound to diverge in the long run. The purpose
of this section is to discuss some of the important contributions that explore how social
mechanisms generate inequality persistence. The common feature of all these papers is that
social stratication due to the presence of neighbourhood eects (peer eects, local funding
of education, etc.) is a key determinant of persistent inequality.
In the empirical section, we start by summarizing the global empirical research on inequality
traps to date. Given that this is a relatively new concept, the literature on this topic is quite
sparse. We then focus on what has been done in South Africa. We start by summarizing the
large body of literature on measuring inequality levels and trends in South Africa. While
5there is considerable debate about the level and trend of inequality in South Africa, the
consensus view is that inequality is exceptionally high and has been so for a prolonged
period. We next focus on what we know about mechanisms through which the persistence of
inequality in South Africa might be explained. These include education, nancial markets,
intergenerational networks and other possible mechanisms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses economic mecha-
nisms from a theoretical point of view. Section 3 considers political mechanisms and Section
4 presents on social mechanisms. Section 5 provides a summary of the related empirical
research to date, with a particular emphasis on South Africa. The paper concludes with
concrete suggestions of avenues for further research on the topic for South Africa.
2 Inequality Traps: Economic Mechanisms
Inequality traps can be generated via economic mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms arising from
the poor and rich interacting in production or in markets. The models that study this type
of mechanism share two key elements. First, they all generate a poverty trap. All models
assume some form of borrowing constraint and a non-convex investment opportunity (i.e.
roughly an investment opportunity that yields good returns only when a sucient amount
has been invested, possibly because of the presence of some xed cost). The combination of
these two ingredients generates a poverty trap because the poor never succeed at investing
suciently so as to reap good returns from the investment. This is because they are poor
and moreover cannot borrow. Thus being poor implies they obtain low returns so that they
remain poor, a poverty trap.
A second feature that these models share is some realm where rich and poor meet, the
outcome of which determines the future returns of the two groups. Typically the realm
consists of a market and the condition that regulates the interaction between rich and poor
is a market clearing condition (although in the representative model we consider this occurs
6via imperfect substitutability in production). In these models, the distribution of income
aects the supply and/or demand of some market, and the price of the market in turn aects
the distribution of income. For instance, in some models, the poor end up as wage labourers
and the rich as entrepreneurs. The rich form the demand for labour and the poor the supply.
The relative sizes of the two groups determine the price of the market, i.e. the wage. And
the wage in turn aects the relative returns of the rich and poor, i.e. prots and wages.
It turns out that the mechanism for inequality persistence in all the models considered is
surprisingly similar. The relative scarcity of the rich individuals implies, via the market
clearing condition (or imperfect substitutability in production), high returns for the rich and
low returns for the poor. The poor being poor and not being able to borrow cannot invest
suciently to obtain good returns, so they remain poor and the rich remain few, so that the
cycle continues.
Despite sharing this key mechanism for inequality persistence the models dier substantially
in their focus. In particular, they dier in the realm in which the rich and poor interact.
The realms of interaction as well as the models addressing each of these are the following:
Production/ Market for skills: Galor and Zeira 1993, Mokherjee and Ray 2002, Ljunqvist
1993, Owen and Weil 1998, Moav and Maoz 2000
Labour market: Banerjee and Newman 1993, Ghatak and Jiang 2002, Matsuyama 2005
Credit market: Aghion and Bolton 1997, Piketty 1997, Matsuyama 2000
Product market: Mani 2001, Matsuyama 2002
In what follows, we rst consider a simple illustrative model to discuss the key mechanisms of
persistence (belonging to the rst type of models, where rich and poor end up with dierent
skill levels and interact in production). Second we consider some extensions of that basic
model that yield additional insights and nally we discuss the remaining type of models.
72.1 Simple Illustrative Model
2.1.1 Environment
We consider the simplest possible model that is able to generate an inequality trap via
economic mechanisms. The model is a simplied version of Maoz and Moav (2000) and
Mokherjee and Ray (2003). Consider an economy with a measure 1 of agents, indexed by
i. Each agent is member of a dynasty, lives for one period and has an ospring. At each
time t there is one member of the dynasty active. Each period, there is an opportunity in
this economy to obtain education. Upon payment of a xed cost F, an individual obtaining
education becomes skilled and receives a wage wH
t . Agents not obtaining education earn the
unskilled wage wL
t . Every period, there are Ht skilled individuals and 1   Ht unskilled.
Demand for skills comes from a representative rm, that produces using skilled and unskilled
labour according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = H

t (1   Ht)
1 
Labour markets are competitive, so demand for dierent types of workers comes from equat-
















Two points are worth noting. First, wH
t may be higher than wL
t (as will be the case in
equilibrium) even if there is no inherent productive advantage for the skilled. Second, both
wages depend on Ht so that, as Ht increases, the skilled workers become more abundant and
their wage wH
t falls, whereas the reverse occurs to the unskilled, and wL
t rises.
8The supply for skills comes from the education decisions of the agents. In the model, educa-
tion is a parental decision. Agents are born either skilled or unskilled (depending on what
their parent decided). They work, earn their corresponding wage, decide whether to send
their ospring to school, consume and die. Agents care about their own consumption and
about the income of their ospring (gross of education costs), as in the \warm glow" bequest
motive. For simplicity, the utility is assumed to be logarithmic and there are no capital mar-
kets at all (actually, it is assumed that agents cannot even leave a nancial bequest to their
ospring). Thus, an agent with wage wi will send her ospring to school if:
Log(w
i
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Two points are worth noting. First, it will always be the richer individuals that send their
children to school, since the utility sacrice of paying the xed cost decreases with income.
This is the due to the concavity of the utility function. Second, the threshold ~ w depends on
tomorrow's skill premium which, in turn, will depend on tomorrow's scarcity of skills Ht+1.
2.1.2 Results
The key equations of the model are 1a and 2. Both relate wages to quantities of skill. The
model will be thus discussed graphically in the wage{skill quantity space, as depicted in
Figure 1. Since our main focus will be on steady states, time subscripts are omitted.
The gure shows wH(H) and wL(H) from production. As mentioned, wH(H) slopes down-
ward and wL(H) upwards. Thus, as skills become more abundant, inequality decreases.
This is because skilled and unskilled workers are imperfect substitutes in production and
9Figure 1: The Baseline Model
an abundance of skills makes skilled workers less valuable. Eventually the skill premium
disappears as H reaches the value  and the two types of workers are equally productive.
The third function shown in Figure 1 is the threshold
~
w. Individuals with wages higher
than the threshold (shaded area) would educate their ospring. This threshold is increasing
in H: as skills become more abundant and the skill premium falls, the incentives to obtain
education are reduced. As H grows and the skill premium falls, only richer people are willing
to educate their ospring. As the skill premium vanishes the threshold tends to innity and
education is not worth investing in for anyone. Conversely, as H tends to zero and the skill
premium tends to innity,
~
w tends to F: Education would be chosen by all those who can
aord it.
The steady states of the model are given by congurations where
~
w lies between wL and
wH. In that case, at current wages, only currently educated individuals would educate their
children. The supply of education would remain the same, in turn giving rise to the same
wages. The situation thus perpetuates.
For the particular values of the parameters in the gure there are two sets of steady states.
One of them occurs at high levels of H. There, unskilled wages wL are high but the threshold
~
w is even higher. At those levels of H, unskilled parents are happy to let their children remain
unskilled even if they could easily aord to pay the education cost. The key here is the skill
10premium, which is very low. The situation remains as a steady state because educated
parents, earning slightly more and needing to sacrice slightly less to pay the cost are willing
to educate their children.
A second set of steady states occurs when H is low. There again
~
w lies between wL and wH,
but the interpretation of the situation is completely dierent. The skill premium is enormous
so that everyone would like to educate their children. However, the unskilled families cannot
do so because in a world with borrowing constraints they have no way of paying the xed
cost. The few skilled families, earning very high wages obviously do provide education to
their ospring so that the situation remains. This situation corresponds to an inequality
trap.
In the example considered in the gure, intermediate levels of education cannot be a steady
state. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The wL line lies above the threshold
~
w, implying
that at current wages, all the population would like to educate their children. In that case,
there is an excess supply of skills and markets adjust wages to make the poor indierent
between educating their children or not. H thus rises and the process continues until we
reach the lowest education level among the high education steady states. In this way, the
model features a \big push" type of mechanism where a country can remain stuck in an
inequality trap. However, if it succeeds in bringing education levels high enough, a virtuous
cycle arises where relatively high unskilled wages generate an excess supply of skills. Markets
then adjust, reducing the skill premium thereby raising unskilled wages even more.
Several interesting conclusions emerge from this simple model. First, the model does generate
an inequality trap, but inequality is largely a by-product. The true driver of the trap is the
interplay between scarcity and poverty. In an inequality trap, the scarcity of the rich (of
skills) generates inequality and poverty. Poverty, in turn, prevents the poor from taking
advantage of the highly rewarding opportunities so that the poor remain poor and the rich
scarce. The actual role of inequality in this model is \positive". To see that, consider
an exogenous increase in the income of the rich that leaves the unskilled wage unchanged
(for instance due to skill biased technical change). What implications would this have on
11Figure 2: Dynamics
the model? The answer is depicted in Figure 3. The threshold
~
w would shift rightward
reecting the positive incentive eects of a higher skill premium. The region of the trap
would shrink so that it would become easier to escape form it. However the eects will
be very small. At the inequality trap steady states, inequality is already very high. The
\binding constraint" for the lack of education of the poor is the education cost, not the lack
of pecuniary incentives from education. An increase in inequality that makes education more
attractive would have only a marginal eect on education decisions. The incentive eects of
inequality in an inequality trap can hardly be exploited further.
Figure 3: Role of inequality
At the same time, that same inequality represents a potentially important source of ine-
ciency. The presence of large inequality represents very favorable investment opportunities
12that are not being undertaken. Eciency would call for more resources allocated to these
opportunities (an increase in education). But this is precisely what does not happen in an
inequality trap: the interplay between poverty and a missing market for credit prevents these
opportunities for being exploited by a large subset of the population (see Mokherjee and Ray
2003).
A last comment of a more \philosophical" nature is perhaps worth making. The model
presented generates inequality even if ex-ante all agents are the same in terms of productive
ability. The rich end up being rich, not because they are inherently more productive, but
essentially because they are scarce. This scarcity ultimately leads to them being more
productive because of the lack of perfect substitutability with unskilled workers. Ultimately,
the rich in an inequality trap of this type are rich because the poor are plentiful and because
they are too poor to obtain the skills necessary to fully substitute the rich in production.
2.2 Extensions
We will consider two extensions of the model that yield interesting insights into inequality
traps via economic mechanisms.
2.2.1 Dierences in ability
Individuals may dier in some inherent characteristic that makes them more or less pro-
ductive, like ambition, motivation, IQ, etc. We consider an extension of the model where
individuals dier in a characteristic that we label ability and that is supposed to capture
the above mentioned ones. The discussion is based on Owen and Weil (1998) and Maoz and
Moav (2000), the latter being the one from whom the modelling strategy is borrowed.
Dierences in ability can be parsimoniously incorporated in the baseline model by assuming
that ability is reected in dierences in the education cost F, which now becomes indexed by
13i, F i. Suppose there is a uniform distribution of ability, with support [FL;FH]. The model





given by her cost F i. The highest of these thresholds denoted (
~
wH) will be the one for the
least able people, with costs FH and the lowest (
~
wL) for the smartest, with cost FL. Figure
4 shows this version of the model. The darker area represents wage levels where everyone
would educate their children whereas in the lighter area the most able, but not the least
able, would.
Figure 4: The Role of Ability
As in the baseline model there are two types of steady states. At low levels of education, there
is a steady state where, again, the rich educated parents educate their children and the poor
uneducated do not. For suciently low levels of H, none of the poor (not even the smartest)
send their children to school whereas all the rich (even the least able) do so. Beyond those
levels of education, smart poor children start going to school while all rich still do. There
is upward mobility but no downward mobility. For high enough levels of education, as the
skill premium becomes low enough, rich educated but low-ability dynasties stop nding it
worth it to educate their children and downward mobility appears. At even higher levels,
the skill premium becomes so low that even the smart kids of uneducated individuals stop
nding it worth going to school: upward mobility stops. Between these two levels (where
downward mobility starts and downward mobility stops), there has to be some level where
upward mobility and downward mobility are equal. That point represents a steady state
(corresponding to the high education set of steady states in the baseline model).
14This extension is important because it adds a novel insight into the ineciency of inequality
traps via economic mechanisms. Inequality traps are inecient, not only because they leave
favorable investment opportunities unexploited, but also because they imply that those that
undertake these opportunities are not those that would benet the most from them. In
this model, even if high ability individuals benet more from education, the criterion for
obtaining education is wealth, not ability. Low ability rich children go to school, high ability
poor children do not. This compares with the \high" steady state with high education,
where schools are composed of high ability individuals, be they rich or poor.
2.2.2 Endogenous education costs
In the baseline model, education costs are xed. Several studies have analyzed models
where these costs are endogenous. There are two main ways to do so, one on the basis
of political economy considerations, where the education cost reects the political decision
over the provision of public vs. private education. Second, by considering education as an
additional production sector where the inputs are dierent types of labor and the output is
an educated individual. The price of the service is the education cost. Models of this type
include Mokherjee and Ray (2003) and Ljunqvist (1993). Here, we adapt the framework of
the latter. We discuss the role of endogenizing the education cost by assessing the dierence
in results it generates relative to the baseline model.
It seems sensible to consider that the education production sector uses skilled labor inten-
sively. The key workers needed to produce education are teachers, who need to be educated
themselves. We consider the extreme version where the education sector is competitive and
uses only skilled labour. If educating one individual requires  skilled workers, the education
cost will equal wH. In this way, the education cost depends, in turn, on inequality.
How does this model compare to the baseline model? The answer is depicted in Figure 5.
Suppose  and F are such that wH (H) = F at some intermediate H. In other words,
parameters are such that at some intermediate level of education, the skilled wage is such that
15the endogenous education cost is exactly F, the xed cost in the baseline model. Because
the education cost now is increasing in the skill wage, education will be more expensive to
the left of that level and cheaper to the right. This implies that the wealth threshold
~
w
rotates clockwise around H, as shown in the gure. The result is that education costs are
higher precisely when they matter the most: when skills are scarce, the skill premium is high
and the unskilled wage is low. In contrast, education becomes cheaper where it matters less:
when skills are abundant and the poor can aord education.
Figure 5: Endogenous cost model
Two points are worth noting of this extension. First, it implies that the inequality trap will
be more dicult to exit. As shown in the gure, the inequality trap region becomes larger
as education costs becomes higher at low education levels. Second, in this model, inequality
matters as such, not just to provide incentives, but perversely, by make it more dicult for
the poor to obtain education. If in an inequality trap skill biased technical change would
increase the skilled wage, the poor would nd it even more dicult to obtain education.
2.3 Other realms of interaction
In the baseline model, rich and poor individuals interact in production. In the remaining
economic mechanisms of inequality traps, the rich and poor interact in markets in the sense
that they nd themselves in opposite sides of some market, the poor in the demand side and
16the rich in the supply side, or vice versa. Dierent models focus on dierent markets, and
interesting insights have been provided by looking at the labour market, the credit market
and (in a slightly dierent manner) the product market. These models are more complex
than the previous one in that both sides of the market emerge from occupational choices of
agents (as opposed to the baseline model, where labour demand comes from some \rm"
established exogenously). As a result, simplications are made in other respects, such as
considering risk neutral agents. Their choices are made on the basis of monetary gains
and losses form dierent options, without considerations for consumption smoothing. This
implies that full equality can be achieved where all agents are indierent between occupations
or between being at one side of the market and the other. Most of the models can still be
discussed on the basis of the quantity vs. wage/income space. In what follows, we will
illustrate heuristically the dierent models using the type of gure of the baseline model
without spelling them out formally.
2.3.1 The labor market
The rich and poor may interact in the labor market. The poor may end up as wage labourers
whereas the rich end up as entrepreneurs. This type of situation has been modelled in the
seminal work of Banerjee and Newman (1993) and further simplied by Ghatak and Jiang
(2002). The latter study provides the basis for the treatment we follow here.
The structure of these models is similar to the one above. Instead of education, there is a
generic investment opportunity involving a xed cost and requiring labour to operate. Those
that exploit that opportunity become entrepreneurs, but because of borrowing constraints,
only those with sucient wealth are able to do so. In the model, each entrepreneur uses one
labourer and everyone has access to some subsistence technology that provides some oor
of earnings (which can also be interpreted as government subsidies in the case of unemploy-
ment).
Figure 6 illustrates the model. H in this case is the share of rich individuals (with wealth
17higher than some threshold) and wH and wL represent the prots of entrepreneurs and the
wages of labourers, respectively. The threshold
~
w represents the xed cost of entrepreneur-
ship. When rich individuals make up less than half of the population, there are more would-be
labourers than entrepreneurs: i.e. there is excess supply of labour. Wages then need to be
kept low in order to make poor people exactly indierent between employment and subsis-
tence. Wages are thus low and prots high. In the example of the gure, the parameters
are such that the threshold
~
w lies between the prots of entrepreneurs and the (subsistence)
wages of labourers. The situation thus perpetuates. These steady states correspond to an
inequality trap.
Figure 6: Labour
Indeed, there is also an equilibrium with full equality. If there are suciently many rich
(more than half in this example), there is potentially excess demand for labour. In that
case, it is rather the rich that need to be made indierent between becoming workers and
entrepreneurs. Wages will therefore be comparatively high and prots low. In fact, income of
the two classes wH and wL will be exactly the same and everyone will be indierent between
working or operating a rm.
The key mechanism is thus the same as in the baseline model: Scarcity of rich individuals
generates inequality and poverty. Poverty, in turn, prevents the exploitation of protable
opportunities so that the poor remain poor and plentiful, thereby perpetuating scarcity of
the rich. Inequality emerges because markets reward scarcity and penalize abundance (in
18this case the abundance of labour is penalized by low wages). Inequality perpetuates because
the missing credit market makes the previous market rewards be the ones determining that
poor and rich remain \segregated" in dierent sides of the market.
Two extensions of this basic model are worth noting. First, in what actually was the origi-
nal contribution of Banerjee and Newman (1993), self employment is added as an additional
occupational choice. While the key mechanisms remain the same, this addition yields po-
tentially interesting insights regarding, for instance, the size of the informal sector. Self
employment is modelled as a investment opportunity requiring a lower xed cost than full
scale entrepreneurship. In that way, in can be interpreted as small scale entrepreneurship in
the informal sector. This version of the model can be interpreted as capturing the interaction
between poverty and informality. When the poor are very poor and abundant, there will be
little self employment/informality. This, in turn, implies that labour supply will be plentiful
and wages low, thus ensuring that the poor remain very poor and plentiful. Another equi-
librium is possible, however, where an abundant middle class leads to large informality so
that the supply of labour is low and wages are high, thereby perpetuating the large size of
the middle class.
The second extension (Matsuyama 2005) allows for labour demand from each entrepreneur
to be optimally chosen. Labour demand naturally depends on the scale of the rm so that
a wealthier entrepreneur will typically demand more labour. In that case, labour demand
depends not only on the size of the rich class, but also on how rich they are. A wealthier
upper class will demand more labour thereby increasing the wages of workers. This generates
a \trickle down" type of mechanism. Under certain conditions, if accumulation is suciently
rapid, as the rich become wealthier, they pull up the wages of the poor and can eventually
bring the poor out of poverty, by making them cross the threshold needed to start a rm
and become entrepreneurs. In this case, the inequality trap can be endogenously overcome,
for inequality today has a positive eect on the poor in the future.
192.3.2 The Credit Market
Another important market where the rich and poor may interact is the credit market. De-
pending on the model, the poor end up as the creditors and the rich as debtors or vice
versa. This has been studied in the work of Aghion and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997) and
Matsuyama (2000). By focusing on the credit market, these articles address explicitly the
microfoundations of capital market imperfections, a key feature present in all the models dis-
cussed so far. Because of moral hazard or adverse selection problems, borrowers may shirk
and not exert enough eort to make their project succeed or may renege on their debts.
These problems are more acute the more a borrower needs to pay back. Thus, the higher
the interest rate and the lower the wealth of the prospective entrepreneur, the higher the
incentive to shirk or escape. Anticipating this, lenders will thus choose not to lend to the
poor, or will lend to them less than what they would want to borrow, and the more so the
higher the interest rate. In this way, these type of models naturally endogenize the threshold
~
w, separating the choices of the rich and poor. We consider rst Matsuyama (2000), which
can be discussed naturally within the framework used so far. Second, we comment on some
valuable additional insights of Piketty (1997) and Aghion and Bolton (1997).
In Matsuyama (2000), agents again face an investment opportunity requiring the payment
of a xed cost. In this case, the opportunity is protable and does not run into decreasing
returns so that it makes sense to borrow and invest as much as possible. Because of the moral
hazard problems just described, lenders only trust (and will lend to) the rich. Thus, the poor
end up lending whereas the rich end up borrowing. In the steady state, income determination
comes from the interest rate: a higher interest rate is benecial to the poor (lenders) and
detrimental for the rich (borrowers). Market clearing in steady state essentially implies a
positive relation between the amount of rich individuals and the interest rate: all else being
equal, few rich implies less demand for funds and a lower interest rate. Thus the steady
states of the model leads to a graph similar to those used up to now. wH now represents
the income of the rich borrowers and wL the income of the poor lenders. A larger number
of rich individuals is associated with a high interest rate, and thus with lower inequality.
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~
w is also increasing, although for a dierent reason as in the baseline model
and not necessary in a convex way. The reason in this case is that the larger interest rate
associated with a higher H makes the moral hazard problems worse and thus implies that
only richer individuals are allowed to borrow to get over the xed cost and invest. The
mechanism is thus essentially similar to the one in the baseline model: scarcity of the rich
leads to low demand for funds and a low interest rate which implies that the poor remain
very poor and the rich remain few.
Interesting additional insights come from Piketty (1997) and Aghion and Bolton (1997). Both
consider situations where decreasing returns eventually limits the protability of investments
so that the very rich become lenders. The poor, in turn, are net borrowers even if they do not
succeed in borrowing as much as they would want to or at suciently favorable terms. Piketty
(1997) emphasizes the potential for inequality persistence. Interestingly the argument here
is about the relation between inequality and the severity of credit constraints: scarcity of
the rich leads to high interest rates, since the rich are the net lenders; at the same time,
high interest rates lead to scarcity of rich, as moral hazard problems make borrowing more
dicult so that the poor accumulate so slowly that the rich remain few. Aghion and Bolton
(1997), in a similar setting, emphasize instead the potential for \trickle down", as we saw
before for the labour market. As the rich accumulate fast enough, their increase in wealth
pushes interest rates down so that credit constraints bind less and less for the poor and they
eventually exit from poverty.
2.3.3 The Product Market
Finally, the rich and poor may end up in essentially dierent sides of some product market.
When preferences are non-homothetic, expenditure shares are not linear and the distribution
of income matters for the demand for dierent products. If workers of dierent classes are
involved in the production of dierent products, one may end up with consumer { producer
interactions that can generate an inequality trap. Studies such as Matsuyama (2002) and,
most explicitly, Mani (2001) consider these type of scenarios.
21The model in Mani (2001) can be simplied to be represented in the type of framework
considered up to now. One part of the model is exactly as in the baseline model: there is
an educational investment opportunity upon the payment of a xed cost and only individ-
uals who are rich enough can exploit it. The dierence here is that the relative returns do
not emerge from the demand for dierent types of labour from a production function, as in
the baseline model. Instead, relative returns are generated in the following way. There are
two sectors, a manufacturing and a luxury sector. Unskilled individuals work in the manu-
facturing sector and skilled individuals in the luxury sector, both using a linear production
function. The luxury sector is open to trade, so that its price is pinned down in international
markets. The manufacturing sector, however, is closed so that the price of the good (and
hence the wage of its workers) is determined by domestic demand. Here lies the interaction
between rich and poor. The more abundant the rich, the more demand for manufacturing
and thus the higher its prices and wages. The resulting graph is essentially as in Figure 1
where wL is the wage of the unskilled working in the manufacturing sector (in this case the
skilled wage wH would be constant, given by international prices of the luxury good). An
inequality trap emerges similar to the ones already discussed.
3 Inequality Traps: Political Mechanisms
This section studies political mechanisms that can lead to inequality traps. In the models
that follow, the interaction between the rich and the poor takes place in the political sphere,
in most of them in the electoral arena. The section briey reviews the political economy
literature aiming to extract insights on how inequality can persist through pro-rich policies
and how the latter come about; it also presents a very exploratory look at some data on
South Africa, when available.
We proceed as follows. First, we present the standard model of redistribution in democracies
(Meltzer and Richard 1981). On the basis of this model, inequality traps should not exist,
given that more unequal countries should redistribute more. South Africa, in turn, with its
22high levels of inequality, should be at the top of the redistribution list. Empirical evidence
suggests that the relation does not hold neither in general nor in particular for South Africa.
Second, we discuss a number of mechanisms/ factors that could be drivers of inequality
persistence via the political sphere. We do so by relaxing dierent parts of the Meltzer and
Richard model. In a rst step, we discuss models/ factors where the median voter cares
about factors other than her current income. In a second step, we study what happens when
the pivotal voter is not the median voter, but a richer individual, i.e. when, eectively, the
poor lose voice in the political process. In a third step, we discuss the impact of clientelism
on redistribution, i.e. models where redistribution does not come through an uniform tax
rate, but where it takes a particularistic form, targeted to particular groups or individuals.
3.1 The Basic Model
The well known basic model addressing the level of redistribution in democracies is Meltzer
and Richard (1981, henceforth M&R). This model describes a world where the available
policy is a uniform tax, individuals care about their own income, and the enacted policy
will be the one preferred by the median voter. Individual demand for redistribution comes
from equalizing the costs and benets of taxation at the margin. The costs come from the
disincentive eects of taxation and are the same for everyone. The benets, in turn, are
determined by the position of the respective individual in the income distribution compared
to the average. The farther an individual is below the average, the more she will gain from
redistribution, the farther above it, the more she will lose from it.
M&R consider a majority voting rule under universal surage. In that case, the pivotal voter
is the median, and so her preferred tax rate will be implemented. A poorer median voter
would thus imply a higher level of redistribution. Typically, a higher level of inequality in a
society implies a poorer median voter relative to the mean, so that more unequal societies
should redistribute more according to this framework. In short, in the M&R world, inequality
traps are nonexistent: higher levels of inequality would lead to more redistribution and no
23vicious circles are possible.2
3.2 Cross-country data on progressivity
The predictions of the M&R model have long been contested empirically. To date, no solid
evidence has been found that more unequal countries redistribute more (see, for instance,
Lindert 2004; De Mello and Tiongson 2003). Here, as an illustration of this, and in order to
place South Africa into the picture, we show some data on inequality and redistribution for
selected countries. The data come from Milanovic (2003) for OECD and Eastern European
countries and from van der Berg (2009) for South Africa. Figure 7 plots the pre-tax Ginis vs.
the percentage decrease of the Ginis due to taxes and transfers, a measure of progressivity
of redistribution.
Figure 7: Progressivity of Redistribution
As can be seen in the graph, there is essentially no relation between the level of inequality
in a country and the progressivity of taxation: In this sample, more unequal countries do
not appear to redistribute more.
2Notice that this also holds for models addressing non-democracies. When inequality is high, the poor
have more to gain from a revolution and conict in a society will increase (see, for instance, Acemoglu and
Robinson 2000)
24What about South Africa? Following the M&R model, we should expect very high levels
of redistribution, given its high levels of inequality. Using data from van der Berg (2009),
we have plugged in data for South Africa in this graph. While these data are not directly
comparable, (the Gini after taxes and transfers includes imputations of indirect transfers,
such as education and health), the exercise can be seen as a rst approximation of redistri-
bution in South Africa compared to international standards. The data suggest that South
Africa reaches, at best, average levels of redistribution.3 Based on these data, it seems plau-
sible that political mechanisms contribute to a possible inequality trap in South Africa. In
the following, we will review a number of factors that could account for \insucient" levels
of redistribution in an unequal country and, where possible, will discuss some descriptive
evidence for South Africa from the World Values Survey and the Afrobarometer.
3.3 Political Mechanisms behind Inequality Traps
3.3.1 Demand for redistribution mechanisms
A rst type of mechanism that might drive inequality traps relates to the demand for redis-
tribution. While the median voter might still dictate policy, and redistribution might still
take the form of a uniform tax rate, voting decisions may be the outcome of factors other
than current income.4 Adding complexity to the individual demand for redistribution can
lead to inequality traps if high inequality is associated with an overall depression of demand
for redistribution. Several models have been proposed recently in that vein, in particular,
addressing the role of eort for demand for redistribution (see Alesina and Angeletos 2005,
Cervellati et al. 2007, B enabou and Tirole 2006). Here, we will focus on B enabou and
Tirole's (2006) model about self-indoctrination and eort.
3This contrasts with what appears to be the standard wisdom in South Africa, namely that the level of
redistribution is very high and that the \problem" is the lack of eciency in the provision of public services.
4There are several excellent general surveys of models of demand for redistribution such as Alesina and
Giuliani (2009) and Harms and Zink (2003).
25In the B enabou and Tirole (2006) model, individuals lack willpower regarding eort. The
eort they would want to make in the future is higher than the one they will be exerting
when the moment comes. Individuals can help solve this problem by investing in optimism.
They do this by trying to change the probability that they will "forget" about information
that eort might not be crucial in determining income (that, instead, social background for
instance might be more relevant). People that have successfully become (over-)optimistic
will regard themselves as upwardly mobile and will thus demand low taxes. If many of
these over-optimistic people live in a society, there will be low taxes/ little redistribution.
In turn, if redistribution is low, low levels of eort (laziness) would pose a severe problem
and individuals have high incentives to invest in over-optimism. The reverse story holds
for a society with a majority of \realist" individuals who do not forget information about
the role of factors other than eort for income. The model provides multiple equilibria: An
optimistic low-tax world, which would nd itself trapped in high levels of inequality and a
realistic high-tax low-inequality world.
The B enabou/ Tirole model - as well as others addressing the role of eort for the (demand
for) redistribution - are typically used to explain dierences between the US and Europe,
where the US represents the low redistribution/ high eort equilibrium and Europe the high
redistribution/ low eort one. How could these stories be applied to South Africa? Starting
from the idea that South Africa indeed nds itself in an inequality trap with insucient
levels of redistribution via the political system, it would imply that South Africans are
over-optimistic and appreciate eort highly.5
We use data from the Afrobarometer and World Values Surveys to evaluate in a very pre-
liminary way the views of South Africans on optimism and eort. The emerging picture is
indeed one of over-optimism and a high appreciation of eort. Figure 8 is based on the 2002
(round 2) Afrobarometer. It asks individuals to rank the income they expect their children
5Notice that this goes against the standard wisdom in South Africa according to which South Africa
would rather represent the European equilibrium with high amounts of social grants that de-incentivizes
individuals to exert eort.
26to have on a scale from 0-10, where 10 represents the rich.6 As can be seen in the graph,
there is a striking percentage of respondents believing their children to be among the rich.
More than 30 percent expect their children to have an income of 10, with another 42 percent
expecting this income to be in the upper half.
Figure 8: Optimism
A similar picture emerges when looking at South African views on the role of "hard work"
for determining success in life. Compared to other countries, South Africans believe that
hard work plays an extraordinarily high role for success. Figure 9 is based on the 2005-2006
World Values Survey. It asks respondents to rank on a scale from 1-10 if it is hard work (1) or
luck and connections (10) that determines success.7 The horizontal axis reproduces the 1-10
scale of these beliefs, the vertical axis shows the percentage of respondents with any of these
opinions. The graph compares the beliefs of South Africans with those of US and Swedish
citizens, where the US stands for a country where "hard work" for success is emphasized
and Sweden for one where the importance of other factors for success is recognized. Indeed
the responses of US and Swedish citizens are as expected, with the US curve starting way
above the Swedish one with around 20% of Americans believing that it is all about hard
6The exact wording is the following: \On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 are \poor" people and 10 are \rich"
people: Which number do you expect your children to attain in the future?"
7The exact phrasing is: \In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life" (1) and \Hard work
doesn't generally bring success|it's more a matter of luck and connections" (10).
27work as compared to around 8% of Swedes. Beyond the value of 6, the Swedish curve
takes the upper position. The South African curve is astonishing. The data suggest that
South African citizens exceed by far US citizens in their belief that hard work determines
success: more than 30% of South Africans believe that this is the case.8 These beliefs are
indeed surprising, given that economic success in South Africa has largely been the outcome
of apartheid legislation - that is, of political choices - and that race is still an important
predictor of income.
Figure 9: Perceptions about the Role of Eort in Determining Success
In sum, both sets of data suggest that part of South Africa's inequality trap might come from
the demand side. Over-optimism and beliefs that eort will bring about success might impede
a demand for redistribution strong enough to break the vicious circle of high inequality
leading to low redistribution, leading to high inequality.
3.3.2 A Richer Pivotal Voter
The predictions of the standard model regarding the positive relation between inequality
and redistribution hinge critically on the assumption that the median individual dictates
8The high gure also assures that this does not simply represent the \white" part of the sample, trying
to justify income inequality in South Africa.
28policy choices. As pointed out in Saint-Paul and Verdier (1996) and B enabou (2000), if
the pivotal voter is suciently rich, the standard positive inequality-redistribution relation
reverses, with more inequality implying less redistribution and vice-versa. The reason is that,
in that case, as inequality increases, the distance of a richer person to the average increases
and she will dislike redistribution more. Therefore, there will be less redistribution in more
unequal societies and more redistribution in less unequal ones. In this way, if the pivotal
voter is not the median, but a richer individual, an inequality trap can emerge. There are,
actually, many reasons why the poor(er) may lose voice in the political process and why
richer individuals might exert inuence beyond their vote. We now turn to some of these
reasons.
The poor vote less. The most straightforward reason why the poor may have less voice is that
they may vote less than the rich. Indeed, for Western democracies, it is a well documented
nding that the poor and uneducated tend to vote less (cf. Sondheimer and Green 2010).
A rst look at voting behavior in South Africa, however, suggests that this is not the case
in that country. Figure 10 is based on data from the 2002 Afrobarometer survey. It plots
income in brackets vs. the percentage abstention in each bracket. As can be seen in the
graph, the poor do not appear to abstain more than the rich in South Africa. If there is a
relation between income and abstention at all, it appears to be rather the rich who do give
up their voting rights.
Parties target swing voters. A second factor that may imply that the poor have less impact
on policy is that parties may direct their attention to particular segments of voters - who
then become the actual pivotal voters. This can be the case if parties believe that some
voters are locked in, i.e. are going to vote for them no matter what, whereas others, the so-
called `Swing Voters', need to be convinced. According to this argument, some voters have
strong ideological preferences (Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998; Cox 2010). These are locked
into voting for particular parties.9 Swing voters, in contrast have much weaker ideological
convictions and can be enticed to vote for a party by policies such as a tax rate favorable
9This is an important dierence from the M&R framework where voters do not have ideological prefer-
ences.
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to them.10 If it were the poor that are locked ideologically, it would imply that the swing
voters, the pivotal ones, are richer. For South Africa, a number of questions thus emerge. Is
there an inequality trap because the poor are locked into voting for the ANC and thus get
less attention by the party? Does the ANC indeed target swing voters and who are they?11
Lobbying. There is a large literature on how lobbying distorts electoral outcomes (see for
instance, the excellent review on redistribution by Boadway and Keen 2000). In the standard
models of lobbying, the policy is the outcome of lobbying eorts of dierent groups instead
of the outcome of voting.12 The richer pivotal \voter" in this case, is a lobby group that
contributes to electoral campaigns or exerts inuence on the government. In Becker's (1983)
\inuence function", for instance, political inuence depends on how much money a lobby
10This can also be done through particularistic transfers to these groups, i.e. club goods, a topic that we
address below.
11Knoesen (2008) argues that the ANC does not target swing voters but rewards constituencies that
overwhelmingly support the party. However, her data - 2000 electoral data to evaluate the reasons behind
policies (gas and electricity connections) that were implemented in the 1990s - does not permit this conclusion.
It could also be that some constituencies give overwhelming electoral support because they received these
new connections, not the other way around.
12In this context, parties do not commit to policies they have campaigned on and voters do not have
perfect information (Harms and Zink 2003).
30spends. Sensibly, the rich will tend to be more successful in their lobbying activities than
the poor. This is so for two main reasons: First, because of group size. Being a smaller
group than the poor, the rich will overcome free-rider problems more easily than the poor
(Olson 1965). Additionally, the smaller group size allows them to distribute higher per capita
gains to their members (Peltzman 1976), thus motivating them better. Second, in a world
of capital imperfections, they can aord contributions more cheaply (see Esteban and Ray
2006).
3.3.3 Political Clientelism
In the M&R model, redistribution takes the form of a linear tax rate. In many countries,
however, redistribution may be targeted to particular groups or individuals. These partic-
ularistic transfers can take the form of club goods - for instance, the building of hospitals
in neighborhoods that support a particular party or politician, or personal benets, such as
food, a job, or medical assistance in exchange for electoral support. Essentially, clientelism
implies vote buying in various ways. It occurs in traditional/ rural settings, where the patron
is the local landlord and the client a subordinate living in that constituency as well as in
modern ones, where the patron is a political \machine" that employs party brokers to buy
supporters.
There is empirical evidence that it is typically the votes of the poor that are bought (Stokes
2005). These votes are cheap because the poor value instant benets -the transfer from the
patron -more than potential public good redistribution later which they might obtain if they
voted for a programmatic pro-poor party.
Pellicer (2009) proposes a model where inequality and clientelism feed back into each other,
thus creating an inequality trap. In the model, the poor can get organized and implement
high levels of redistribution, but this takes time. To prevent that, the rich can provide
clientelistic transfers immediately. The immediacy of transfers commands a premium for the
poor so that aggregate redistribution is lower in the clientelistic setting. Moreover, the higher
31the level of inequality, the higher is this premium, as deeper poverty implies larger marginal
utility of immediate income. Thus, whereas low inequality leads to the poor organizing
and obtaining high redistribution, high inequality leads to a clientelistic situation with low
redistribution, i.e. an inequality trap.
4 Inequality Traps: Social Mechanisms
There is an important strand of literature emphasizing the role of social factors as the
main driver of inequality persistence. That social factors play a fundamental role in the
perpetuation of poverty and inequality is a standard idea in the social sciences. For instance,
sociologists argue that space and community inuence individuals' perceptions, aspirations
and opportunities. In economics, this strand of the literature is mostly concerned with
neighbouhood eects, in particular the eects of residential neighbourhood on education
and income inequality (B enabou 1993, 1996; Durlauf 1996; Fernandez and Rogerson 1997,
etc.). In those models, a child's education is determined among others by school quality
and the characteristics of the residents of his neighbourhood.13 Parental income matters
because it determines the choice of the neighbourhood in which families live. Within this
setting, relatively unequal economic status may persist across generations in the presence of
economic segregation. If rich families concentrate in neighbourhoods with high quality social
interaction (good eductation, presence of role models, peer eects, etc.) while poor families
live in poor neighbourhoods (where education performance is poor and children lack role
models), the trajectory of these families is bound to diverge in the long run. The purpose
of this section is to discuss some of the important contributions that explore how social
mechanisms generate inequality persistence. The common feature of all these papers is that
social stratication due to the presence of neighbourhood eects (peer eects, local funding
of education) is a key determinant of persistent inequality.
13Here, a community or a neighbourhood represents a group of individuals who provide and fund education
locally to all its members.
324.1 Peer Eects, Local funding of schools and Inequality
The rst paper of interest is B enabou (1996). The author investigates the causes for social
stratication (or segregation) and its implications for inequality and productive eciency.
The economy is composed of two groups, the rich R and the poor P who dier by their
endowment in human capital (hR > hP). The city is divided into two communities, one of
high quality (e.g. a suburb) and one of low quality (e.g. the inner city). The proportion
of rich people is denoted xS in the suburb and xI in the inner city. The model has two
periods. In period 1, an agent with human capital h consumes, pays his rent  and tax t(h)
using his initial endowment !(h) and debt d. In period 2, the agent works to nance his
consumption or bequest and repay his debt P(h;d) so that his income is y(h) = c0+P(h;d).
The agent's ospring are provided with human capital h0 = F(h;L;E) determined by the
parent's human capital h, the quality of social interaction L (local sociological spillover:
role model, peer eect, etc.), and spending in education E. One can assume that local
neighbourhood spillover is such that: L0(x)  0. In addition, in each community, residents
fund education through taxation.





increases in h OR Rxh(h;;x) = Rx(hA;;x)   Rx(hB;;x) > 0 (3)
In other words, equilibrium in the housing market results in stratication as long as the rich
(in human capital) are willing or able to pay a larger rent premium to live in the suburb
than the poor. If the proportion of the rich in human capital was even slightly higher
in the suburb, i.e. xS > xP, the suburb becomes more desirable due to its better social
environment. Moving to a better community, however, comes at a price captured by the
rent premium between the two communities S  I. As the rich are more willing to pay for
this premium to benet from a better environment, stratication of the communities starts
until one of them becomes completely homogeneous.
33Various forces combine to drive the process of social stratication. We focus only on two of
them. The rst and most important determinant is what B enabou (1996) calls local comple-
mentarities. Stratication occurs whenever there is complementarity between neighbourhood
quality L and an individual adult's human capital h. That is, when rich families value more
the eect of neighbourhood quality on their ospring's education than poor families do, i.e.
FhL = FL(hR;L)   FL(hR;L) > 0. Second, credit market imperfections may play an im-
portant role. In the presence of credit market imperfections, the cost of contracting a debt
is higher for poor families so that rich families will nd it easier to borrow money to move
to a quality neighbourhood thus displacing the poor to lower quality neighbourhoods. Or
equivalently, poor families that value education will be prevented from moving to a quality
neighbourhood because of the high cost of borrowing.
The process of stratication compounds parental disparities in human capital h with neigh-
bourhood/social disparities L, which results in persistent inequality. The existence of local
increasing returns of ospring education FhL > 0 is the key mechanism through which in-
come inequality persists. When the marginal returns of parental education increases with
the quality of the neighbourhood, the rich will prefer to isolate themselves in suburbs. As a
result their ospring's human capital will increase at an increasing rate widening the human
capital inequality between rich and poor. This divergence in human capital between inner
city and suburb in turn translates into income inequality persistence.
Besides being potentially unequal, the equilibrium is also likely to be inecient. Eciency
of segregation depends on the trade-o between (i) local complementarities between fam-
ilies' human capital and local social spillover, i.e. FhL > 0; (ii) the decreasing marginal
productivity of education with respect to local spillover, i.e. FLL < 0; and (iii) the rela-
tive contribution of the rich to each community: L00(x) < 0 indicates that the quality of
the neighbourhood increases with the proportion of rich people x at an decreasing rate. In
other words, the contribution of the rich to the neighbourhood quality is greater in the in-
ner city than in the suburb. In moving to a suburb, rich families take into account their
private benets from local complementarities between education and neighbourhood quality.
However, they ignore the negative external eects their departure imposes on the inner city
34(deterioration of the quality of the inner city).
B enabou (1996) moreover shows that the existence of a decentralised (local) funding of edu-
cation tends to amplify the eect of the local spillovers discussed above. Whenever education
expenditures and local spillovers are complementary, these expenditures tend to increase with
the proportion of rich people in a given neighbourhood. The presence of complementarity
between parental education and community quality together with the incentive for agents
to move into areas with people of similar preferences14 generates stratication even when
the marginal product of community quality is greater for the poor relative to the rich. Such
stratication tends to be inecient since the net private benet ignores not only the external
eect of the deterioration of the inner city but also the fact that neighbourhood quality L
and education expenditures are potentially substitutes, i.e. FEL < 0. In such a case, one
dollar spent on education in the inner city raises educational outcomes more than in the
suburb.
Hence local complementarities (direct peer eects), or local funding of schools (scal ef-
fects) combined with the housing market are the main drivers for segregation and inequality
persistence in this model. This paper has a number of distinctive features. Agents are
heterogeneous and dier in their human capital endowments. Credit markets are imperfect
although they are not necessary for stratication. However these imperfections compound
the eect of local complementarities.
4.2 A model of inecient segregation
B enabou (1993) shows that these features are not necessary for inecient segregation to
occur. In his paper, (i) agents are identical: there is no heterogeneity in ability, or in
endowment; and (ii) credit market imperfections are absent. He models how peer eects
(education spillovers) aects the composition of skills leading to segregation as high skilled
people benet more from education spillover the higher their number.
14This allows individuals to be able to set education policies as close as possible to their own preferences.
35The paper tries to explain the eect of social stratication on eciency in production when
skilled and unskilled labour are complementary and education is a local public good. The
agents in this economy live in a city and choose the community or neighbourhood they want
to live in given the cost of rental, local education cost or benet. They also choose between
three occupations: skilled labour (e.g. managers and professionals), low-skilled labour (e.g.
assembly line workers) and unemployment. Skilled and low-skilled labour are complementary
in production. Production is realised at the city level (global level) while education is a local
public good that is provided and nanced at the community level.
Skilled labour comes with high wages wH and high cost of education CH, while low-skilled
labour faces lower wage wL and lower cost of education CL. It is assumed that these costs
decrease with the proportion of skilled labour x present in a given community: there exists
positive education spillover (e.g. peer eects in education) due to the presence of high-
skilled workers, i.e. C0
j(x) < 0 with j = H; L. In addition, the education externality is
greater for high-skilled workers than for low-skilled ones. In other words, people investing
in high skills benet more from education spillover than those investing in low skills i.e.
C0
H(x) < C0
L(x). Suppose that all agents have initially the same characteristics and that
there is no unemployment. The author analyzes how the asymmetric eect of local education
spillover between high and low skilled workers drives the endogenous determination of the
distribution of occupations, residential locations and land rents.
When agents have identical human capital, complementarity in production requires that
some individuals will invest in high skills and others in low skills so that all agent are
indierent between the two occupations i.e. wH(x)   CH(x) = wL(x)   CL(x).
When education is a local public good nanced at the community level, and complementarity
in production takes place at the city level, segregation arises whenever C0
H(x) < C0
L(x). If the
proportion of the high skilled population is even slightly larger in the suburb, xS > xI, then
people investing in high skills move to the suburb to benet from more education spillover.
This migration increases the rent premium  = S  I in the suburb. This process contin-
ues until one of the communities becomes perfectly segregated. The segregated equilibrium
36is inecient when the social returns to the concentration of high skilled individuals are de-
creasing. That is, when the increased costs incurred by those remaining in the inner city as
high skilled workers migrate outweighs the reduced costs enjoyed by the high-skilled workers
who migrate to the suburb. The outcome is inecient because those who leave the inner
city are only interested in the private benet from education (due to C0
H(x) < C0
L(x)) and do
not internalise the social cost that their departure imposes on the residents of the inner city.
More generally the convexity of the total cost of education (x) = xCH(x) + (1   x)CL(x)
is the main culprit for the ineciency of the equilibrium. This is because when (x) is
convex, stratication increases the total education costs since the external marginal loss to
the inner city outweighs the external marginal benet that accrues to the suburb. Because
the external eect of higher levels of stratication on the low-skilled people is not captured
by the market system in the form of a higher rent to the high skilled people who are moving
to the suburb (rent price discrimination), the equilibrium is inecient.
So far, it has been assumed that employment is always preferable to unemployment in that
the cost of eort to obtain a low level of education is not too high. Suppose now that, as a
result of the stratication process, the inner city is only inhabited by a low skilled population.
Suppose also that the returns to low skilled education are negative so that unemployment is
preferred to a low skilled occupation. Then the inhabitants of the inner city are better o
dropping out of the labour market. The city-wide contraction in the supply of low skilled
labour then raises the wage for the low skilled occupation. Therefore there is an incentive
for more suburb dwellers to take on low skilled jobs to increase their wages. The process
continues until the labour market clears. However, as a result of segregation, output can only
be produced by individuals living in the suburb, which results in a signicantly reduced level
of production and welfare. Thus, whenever unemployment is allowed, segregation can worsen
the outcome even further and becomes self-defeating by creating unproductive ghettos, which
has a negative impact on the overall productivity of the city.
374.3 Social stratication and inequality dynamics
The models discussed above are not concerned with dynamics. Rather, they may be seen
as describing long run steady state equilibria. To the extent that shocks to human capital
or income may have long-lasting eects, both initial conditions and transition paths do
matter. Durlauf (1996) provides a model where the long run distribution of skills and
income are path-dependent. He develops an overlapping generations model in which in each
family i, parents allocate their income yit between consumption cit and taxes Tit. Each
neighbourhood sets its own tax rate proportional to families' income levels according to the
median voter rule in order to nance the education or human capital investment hit of their
ospring. The education level is also chosen at the neighbourhood level so that all children
in a given neighbourhood enjoy the same education irrespective of their parents' income.
The existence of a proportional tax system implies that, in an integrated neighbourhood,
the rich families subsidize the education of the poor. As a consequence, the rich may have
incentive to regroup in segregated neighbourhoods to avoid this redistribution. Since the per
capita cost of education C(Hit;nt) decreases with the number of families nt living in a given
neighbourhood, an integrated neighbourhood may nevertheless be appealing to the wealthy
if they benet suciently from economies of scale.
When human capital is a local public good and productivity shocks depend both on family
income and the neighbourhood income distribution (this is similar to the B enabou (1993)
complementarity assumption), the endogenous stratication of the economy becomes a plau-
sible outcome when the rich set income barriers to entry to prevent families with un-desired
characteristics to move to their neighbourhood. This entry requirement is essentially equiv-
alent to housing prices (B enabou 1993 and 1996) combined with zoning rules (Fernandez
and Rogerson 1997). The rich face the trade-o between (i) living in an integrated com-
munity with low per capita cost of providing education; and (ii) isolating themselves in a
homogeneous community to avoid subsidising the education of the poor, or to minimise the
likelihood of negative neighbourhood shocks. When the latter dominates, rich families end
up in quality neighbourhoods, insuring their ospring against negative shocks (and therefore
38downward mobility) by a continuous and increasing investment in human capital in each
generation. In contrast, poor families end up in poor neighbourhoods and are unable to
fund adequately the education of their ospring because of liquidity constraints. This re-
sults in low levels of human capital and therefore low future incomes as the occupational
choices available to the poor are constrained by their education level. In the long run, this
phenomenon may generate poverty traps and increased inequality as the gap between rich
and poor neighbourhoods widens. The poor will be trapped in neighbourhoods with low or
no prospect of social mobility, where role models are conspicuously absent. The process of
homogenisation may ultimately result in persistent inequality.
5 Inequality Traps: An empirical review
Following on from the overviews presented in the previous sections, we turn our attention to
what empirical literature exists for the existence and measurement of inequality traps.15 We
rst focus on what has been done elsewhere, and then consider specically the South African
environment. As emphasized in the theory, an inequality trap is not the same as a poverty
trap, although the two do coincide. Moreover, a specic requirement of an inequality trap is
that there is something about inequality itself which leads to dynamic stability in the degree
of inequality, even though lower levels of inequality may be sustained in equilibrium.
To empirically identify these characteristics is challenging. One would need to start with
existence. Are we currently in a state of equilibrium in terms of inequality? This is very
hard to distinguish from a state of disequilibrium with a slow convergence rate. Is there a
lower level of inequality that could be sustained in equilibrium? Since we cannot observe
counterfactual possibilities in the data, we would need to appeal to comparisons across some
combination of time and regions. In terms of actual inequality traps, we would need to
identify observable mechanisms that both arise due to inequality, and at the same time
15For the remainder of this paper, the term \inequality" is used to refer specically to \income inequality"
unless specied otherwise.
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Given the empirical challenges involved with this, both in terms of data available and econo-
metric identication, it is not surprising that the area has not been thoroughly researched in
South Africa. Indeed, it is unclear whether the questions of existence are even answerable,
regardless of the country under consideration. Thus far, there are only a small number of
papers that have seriously attempted to identify this, and it remains unclear whether these
have been methodologically satisfactory yet. This being said, the challenges are somewhat
moot. Based on all of the evidence that we have, South Africa is a highly unequal society in
terms of its income distribution, and it has been so for as long as we have decent national
household level income data. It would also be safe to assume that it was a highly unequal
society for several decades, if not centuries, prior to the collection of such data. This is
sucient to motivate our research.
The primary focus of this section is to identify causes and consequences of income inequality
in multiple dimensions, and where possible, to ask which of these possible dimensions fulll
a dual role of being both a cause and a consequence. We summarize the related literature
below and then list a number of avenues which we believe might be useful paths of inquiry.
5.1 Evidence from other countries
One recent paper that posits an empirical test of the inequality trap concept is a short
article by Daymon and Gill (2009). To our knowledge, it is the only published research
that proposes a formal econometric test for the existence of an inequality trap. The authors
use a GMM estimator and use time series variation over 71 countries between 1963 and
2003. Of these, 40 are emerging economies. In essence, they estimate whether the inequality
dynamics in countries over time is a function of the initial conditions of that country. That
is, they regress the inequality measure at a point in time on lagged values of inequality and
a host of other variables for a set of countries. These other variables include measures of
political liberty, access to credit, gender inequality, youth literacy, population growth and
40infant mortality. Note that this method does not account for an individual's position within
their country's income distribution. Their ndings are that inequality persistence is a global
phenomenon, and is more pronounced in emerging economies. Of the additional variables,
the most signicant are domestic credit markets, infant mortality (which they use as a proxy
for overall access to healthcare), the population growth rate and the youth illiteracy rate.
A second paper which focuses on Mexico is by Guerrero, L opez-Calva and Walton (2006).
Their paper is more concerned with how powerful interest groups, in particular concentrated
wealth in the business sector and unions in the labour market, generate ineciencies in the
economy. Their argument essentially involves using multiple examples to support the view
that the concentrated power leads to inuence over policy in ways that both reproduce the
inequality and limits growth. Some of the mechanisms through which this occurs include
anti-competitive behaviour on the part of rms and low quality educational outputs due to
inecient performance incentives for unionized teachers.
A third useful document is a proposal for empirical research by Cruces et al (2010), in
which they discuss how they will attempt to identify inequality traps in Latin American
Countries (LAC). The authors start by tightly dening what they mean by an inequality
trap, and emphasize that inequality in outcomes is not sucient for identifying a trap as a
trap must also lead to persistence of inequality over time. Instead, they focus on inequality
of opportunities, which do have an eect on outcomes. Thus, they argue that one needs to
observe both opportunities and socioeconomic mobility, i.e. outcomes, in order to be able
to identify inequality traps. They expand further by providing various dierent measures of
opportunity, as well as the datasets and variables they will use. Even though there are no
results per se, this proposal provides a succinct summary of challenges for empirical work in
this eld, as well as practical ways forward that have been suggested to date.
We next turn our attention to the South African literature. It is worth stating up front that
no researcher has yet attempted to identify whether or not South Africa is experiencing an
inequality trap within the framework discussed.
415.2 What do we know about the levels and trends in inequality
in South Africa?
To date, a large body of literature has evolved primarily concerned with measuring inequality.
This is sometimes done in a static sense, and sometimes in a relative sense to obtain a measure
of the direction, degree and rate at which inequality has been changing.
One of the papers is by Leibbrandt, Bhorat and Woolard (2001), who make use of data
from the Income and Expenditure survey of 1995 (IES95). They also compare their results
to analogous estimates from the 1993 PSLSD survey. The authors analyse household level
income inequality using a variety of techniques. They rst consider the importance of race in
understanding aggregate inequality in South Africa, using a variety of measures that allow for
the decomposition of aggregate inequality into within race and between race components.
While the magnitude of the relative contribution of these two components is ambiguous
depending on which dataset and which measure is being used, the contribution of between
race inequality to aggregate inequality is very high by international standards. The authors
then focus on possible mechanisms that might explain the high levels of observed inequality,
namely the labour market, asset ownership and welfare. Of these, the labour market, and
in particular unemployment, drives inequality the most. Wage income contributes about
67% of inequality, and almost half of this is driven by households with no wage income. At
the same time, state transfers make a negative contribution to poverty.16 The overall point,
after much investigation, is that wage inequality is by far the major contributor to income
inequality, and that an important factor to consider is unemployment/non-employment.
A second important paper in the measurement of inequality in South Africa is the one
entitled \Not Separate, Not Equal: Poverty and Inequality in Post-Apartheid South Africa",
by Hoogeveen and  Ozler (2005). In essence, they take the paper by Leibbrandt et al forward
by comparing income and expenditures from the IES95 to the IES00, which was conducted
16Note that in 1995, a number of current grants, particularly the Child Support Grant, had not yet been
introduced.
42in 2000. In addition to the IES data, they merge the IES95 with the corresponding October
Household Survey (OHS) from 1995, and the IES00 with the September 2000 Labour Force
Survey (LFS). They nd that inequality increased during this period, mostly due to an
increase in the inequality measured within the African subpopulation. For example, for the
entire sample the mean log deviation increased from 0.56 to 0.61 during this period, while the
Gini coecient increased from 0.565 to 0.577. For Africans the mean log deviation increased
from 0.37 to 0.436. The share of between group inequality decreased from 38.3% to 33.2%.
The authors also document that poverty, especially extreme poverty, increased. They then
investigate how much of the observed changes are due to changes in endowments as compared
to the price of endowments. One observation they make is that the returns to education
increased particularly for Africans with high levels of education. They posit that this is a ma-
jor component in understanding the increased inequality within Africans, since the increase
in educational endowments amongst Africans was relatively small. This in turn explains the
observed change in overall inequality. One of their concluding policy recommendations is to
`focus on improving quality educational attainment for the poor'.
There are several other papers that have attempted to measure poverty and inequality in
South Africa. These include the papers by Leibbrandt, Levinsohn and McCrary (2010),
Ardington, Lam, Leibbrandt and Welch (2005), Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn and Argent
(2010), van der Berg and Louw (2004), van der Berg, Louw and Yu (2008) and Yu (2010),
and even this list is not exhaustive. They dier in terms of the datasets employed, the
assumptions underlying how to deal with missing data and whether the analysis is done at
the household or individual level. In terms of ndings, there remains debate about the actual
levels of inequality and the rate at which it is changing.
One of the more recent papers on inequality is by van der Berg (2010). He succinctly
summarizes the state of the literature in South Africa as follows: "Thus there was probably
a strong upward trend in inequality as measured by the Gini coecient in the second half of
the 1990s, and largely stable inequality since. Inequality is clearly very high, but how high
43is not clear due to data comparability and measurement issues."17
For our purposes, this is a sucient statement to motivate out research agenda. The overall
point is that inequality was very high, and has remained so or even increased over the past
fteen years. We turn next to consider what research has been done to understand why
inequality in South Africa has been so persistently high.
5.3 Mechanisms through which inequality traps might develop
5.3.1 Education
As discussed in the theoretical section, one mechanism through which inequality might be-
come persistent would be that only a few wealthy individuals obtain high levels of education,
and this scarcity of skills subsequently generates very high rates of return for these highly
skilled individuals. This generates a persistent level of inequality.
Several researchers, most recently van der Berg (2010), point to the importance of the labour
market and educational attainment as an important factor in understanding South African
inequality. He also stresses the importance of the quality of education as being relevant. Lam
(1999) nds that highly convex returns to schooling are such that modest improvements in
educational attainment are unlikely to signicantly aect the overall inequality distribution.
Hoogeveen and  Ozler (2005) and Leibbrandt, Levinsohn and McCrary (2010), at the house-
hold and individual levels respectively, both attribute the widening inequality between 1995
and 2000 to increases in the rates of return to education.
Thus, a large part of the inequality that exists could be attributed to inequality in educational
attainment. For example, the 2008 wave of the National Income Dynamics Study shows
that there are relatively few skilled people. Only 4.3% of adults have a Bachelors degree or
higher and only 13.9% have some form of post secondary schooling. This is also reected
17Pp. 12
44in dierences in educational attainment by race. Amongst whites, 19.4% have a Bachelors
degree or higher, and over 40% have some form tertiary training, whereas the corresponding
numbers amongst Africans are 1.8% and 9.1% respectively.
Keswell (2004) shows that while in 1993 the returns to education were the same for both race
groups, by 2002 the returns to education for whites had increased substantially relative to
Africans. He points out that this may reect unobservable dierences in educational quality
conditional on attainment by race or occupational stratication. Thus, even though the least
educated race group has experienced an increase in mean years of schooling between 1993
and 2002, both in absolute and relative terms, the change in their rate of return does not
strongly aect overall inequality in earnings.
While Keswell is estimating returns per year of schooling, regardless of the level of school-
ing, Branson, Leibbrandt and Zuze (2009) focus specically on tertiary education. When
focusing on tertiary qualication over the period 2000 - 2007, they nd consistently strong
returns to education in both employment rates and earnings. They argue that there are
strong incentives to attain a tertiary qualication if possible, but that the ability to do so is
constrained. Some of these constraints are nancial, while some occur through a process of
inadequate preparation at prior schooling levels.
Note that this is by no means an exhaustive survey of the economics of education literature
in South Africa. What it suces to point out is that:
 There are barriers that prevent historically poorer groups from attaining high levels of
education,
 There is a relatively scarce supply of highly educated workers in the labour force, and
 There is a large rate of return to tertiary qualications.
Within the theoretical framework presented above, this has all of the markings of an inequal-
ity trap.
455.3.2 Financial Mechanisms
The second broad group of models discussed involves nancial markets in some sense. The
poor are either credit constrained which prevents them from investing in otherwise protable
investments, due to a lack of collateral or other characteristics that make them more risky for
lenders. Alternatively, they pay more for credit, which limits their ability to accrue wealth
at a rate faster than their wealthier counterparts.
Empirically, there is much less evidence on this. In part, most analysis in based on household
and individual surveys, and the questions generally do not adequately cover these facets. For
example, if a poor person has no debt since no one will lend to them, questionnaires do not
generally ask about the cost of debt that a person would pay if they did indeed have such debt,
when said person does not have any debt. In addition, the non-response in such surveys is
likely not random, with wealthier households being less likely to participate. Finally, many
people refuse to answer questions about both income and wealth, and the overall picture
remains somewhat unclear.
The National Credit Regulator (NCR) maintains a database of individual indebtedness that
would likely be a useful source of information. They also have several reports available on
their website at www.ncr.org.za .The South African Savings Institute (SASI) in conjunction
with FinMark trust commissioned some research on savings behavior for old age among
poorer people in South Africa. The main nding they report is that savings rates for the
express purpose of retirement are very low. The reasons for this include myopia, aordability,
alternative investments such as education of children and housing, inexible savings products
and the state provided old age pension.
One of the few published academic papers on savings, insurance and debt is the review article
by Ardington et al (2004). They too observe that while South Africa had a well developed
nancial sector, it was only households at the upper end of the spectrum that could aord
to make use of these services. In particular, both cost and location act to exclude the rural
poor from using the formal banking system. Obtaining a more thorough understanding of
46the opportunities to borrow, save and manage risk across the income distribution would be a
useful though daunting exercise as a sub-component of understanding inequality persistence
in South Africa.
5.3.3 Other mechanisms
Some other mechanisms exist that may be both a cause and a consequence of inequality.
One of these involves human capital in the form of health. South Africa has a well developed
private healthcare system, and a less well resourced public health care system. This might
arise due to high inequality as follows: The public sector struggles to keep doctors within
the state service as the highly skilled doctors want all the privileges and amenities that come
with the high incomes they can earn in the private sector. Poorer people cannot aord the
private healthcare and medical insurance, and thus have to use the over-burdened public
health system, which leads to a greater degree of health risks and problems among poorer
people. This in turn aects their labour market outcomes, which in turn generates inequality.
Crucial to this hypothesis is that the supply of doctors and nurses is constrained, which it
certainly is for a number of reasons.
A dierent mechanism could be due to crime. Demombynes and  Ozler (2005) nd evidence
that crime is positively correlated with local inequality in South Africa. At the same time,
Kingdon and Knight (2001) posit that one reason for the low levels of informal sector activity
in South Africa may be due to the high rates of crime. If a business needs to pay some xed
cost for security, then there are likely to be certain thresholds of scale below which the cost
of security is prohibitive. This would limit the poor from engaging in what might otherwise
be protable activities, thus reinforcing the income distribution.
Yet another possible mechanism may be more in line with the social stratication and access
mechanisms discussed above. Indeed, Magruder (2010) examines the importance of network
based intergenerational correlations in employment in South Africa. He nds that geograph-
ically present fathers may be responsible for a one third increase in their sons' employment
47rates.
6 Conclusion
We conclude with a brief discussion about future research possibilities. From an empirical
perspective, there are several interesting questions which further research could feasibly
inform. One analysis to perform would be to replicate the research proposal of Cruces et
al. Given the amount of time and eort they have invested to operationalize an empirical
measure to identify inequality traps, it should be reasonably simple to replicate their study
for South Africa using our abundance of micro-datasets. This would then have the very
useful characteristic of being able to compare our ndings with those obtained from a host
of other countries where the same methodology has been used.
Many of the mechanisms that generate inequality traps involve the labour market in some
form or another. In addition, all of the empirical studies on measuring inequality in South
Africa agree that understanding the labour market is central to understanding inequality.
This applies both in terms of wages and unemployment domestically. While exceedingly
broad, any information about the puzzle of extremely high and persistent unemployment
would be useful. In particular, if the costs of complying with legislation are that onerous, why
do people not choose self employment of some sort? A simple survey among the unemployed
might be very useful. A more specic question to ask, following on from the paper on Mexico,
is whether in a time-space sense higher inequality correlates with higher levels of unionization,
and whether that in turn correlates with higher steady state levels of unemployment?
Questions about the production function for education and education quality have been
asked. As yet, there are no clear answers about what makes a good school `good'. How
much of quality is really perceived, and how much is genuinely productive quality? This leads
to models of imperfect information and statistical discrimination on the part of employers.
Moreover, what are the full rates of return to school quality, after accounting for the costs,
48the probability of success, and subsequent attainment of a tertiary qualication?
One research method that we could employ would be to use institutional rules on nancial
aid at a place like UCT to instrument for enrollment. With enough planning and resources,
we could nd people from the past who did and did not receive assistance, and then estimate
the returns to enrollment. This maps into the eect of nancial constraints on investment
in education, and how this in turn may or may not perpetuate inequality.
When we consider the role of nancial markets and access to credit, it seems that a lot of
work has been done by non-academic researchers. A starting point would be to update the
2004 review done by Ardington et al (2004). Moreover, data could potentially be obtained
from the NCR, SARS and the state housing registration oce on property prices. Each
of these would yield dierent types of data that would be less susceptible to problems of
non-response that arise in the household or individual level surveys.
An additional research question could be to use something like the NIDS data to look at
how people who do and do not have bank accounts accrue assets dierently, or manage to
navigate adverse shocks.
If we consider health, we can use the incidence of an illness in conjunction with the location of
the individual to proxy for variation in the general quality of healthcare received. Particularly
in rural areas, the closest clinic may be several kilometers away and might be staed only by
nurses without any doctors. This might yield an unbiased estimate on the returns to health
for dierent people.
Political mechanisms may contribute to inequality persistence in South Africa. Having been
explored little, they oer ample research potential. On the demand side, key questions are
to determine how strong demand for redistribution actually is and what the drivers behind
a potentially weak demand are. Are they to be found in (self-)indoctrination of the sort
found in the U.S. or do they lie in an optimism that is due to the recent political transition?
It will be equally important to explore factors relating to a lack of inuence of the poor on
policy such as lobbying by interest groups or the ideological allegiances of the South African
49poor. Finally, studies of the strength and form of clientelism in South African politics may
give fruitful insights into how (local) politicians may perpetuate inequality by buying o the
poor.
Although the papers on social mechanisms analyse situations that are specic to the United
States, they uncover mechanisms that are also potentially relevant to South Africa given
its history. Here the apartheid system institutionalised racial segregation and created an
environment that generated neighbourhood eects and persistent inequality. However, in
this particular case the exclusion mechanism was not the housing market, zoning rules or
income barriers. Instead, it was the system of institutionalised racial segregation that kept
blacks (in the general sense) from the good neighbourhoods. Since the Group Areas Act
was repealed in the early 1990s, the process of segregation has become economic rather than
purely racial (although race and economic status in SA remain highly correlated). Studies
exploring the consequences of the repealment of the Group Areas Act on the migration
patterns and educational performance of the various groups of colour dened under apartheid
would be fascinating. What is the pattern by race? If the formerly disadvantaged move to
better neighbourhoods (formerly white areas or simply areas that were better o than their
own), how do the inhabitants of the area respond to this migration? Any such responses
may occur in several dimensions, including accommodation, building of income or cultural
barriers, migration and the private provision of public goods (e.g. private schools rather
than public school system). What is the overall evolution of those areas where the formerly
disadvantaged migrated to in terms of neighbourhood quality, educational performance, etc.
In conclusion, there remains many interesting and important questions related to the highly
persistent inequality in South Africa. Of these, there are several which can be pursued
successfully. This summary will act as a guide in our future research activities.
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